Labour's first 100 days of foreign policy

This commentary was first published by the UK in a Changing Europe.

Just over 100 days in and Labour’s foreign policy has seen considerable continuity of focus with its predecessor. This is primarily because Labour unequivocally committed to military and diplomatic support for Ukraine and inherited a Middle East at war in the aftermath of Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel. But the tone of the Labour government’s diplomacy has been different.

Ukraine recapitulated

The Labour government took swift action after assuming office to demonstrate that there would be no alteration in the level of the UK government’s support for Ukraine. Defence Secretary John Healey travelled to Odessa within 48 hours of his appointment, announcing an additional package of military equipment for Ukraine and that previous commitments made by the Sunak government would be delivered.

President Zelensky was invited to address the British Cabinet on 19 July.  As the first leader to do so since President Clinton in 1997, this act of public diplomacy conveyed that the new government considered UK-Ukraine relations to have a special importance. Nevertheless, the UK has not departed from the US position of limiting Ukraine’s use of UK-supplied long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike targets in Russia, which Kyiv has been pushing for.

Nuance on Israel

Labour has maintained the position of the previous government of strong public support for Israel and a commitment to use UK military assets to support Israel’s defence against Iran, whilst also seeking a ceasefire and hostage releases as a prelude to a permanent end to hostilities. It has also continued Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect merchant shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks.

There have, however, been two changes of UK government policy since July. First, the government has suspended 30 of the 350 licences covering arms exports from the UK to Israel on the basis ‘that they might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law’.

Second, it has away from the previous government’s position of questioning whether the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor had jurisdiction for warrants requested from the court for the arrest of Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and defence minister, Yoav Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The UK government also restored funding to UNRWA, the U.N. agency supporting Palestinian refugees. This departed from the position of the Conservative government, adopted alongside the US in January 2024, after Israel accused UNWRA staff of direct involvement in the 7 October attacks.

Progressive realism in action?

The UK’s position on Israel has been an early test of whether the ‘progressive realism’ promoted by Foreign Secretary David Lammy as an organising principle for Labour’s foreign policy can guide its actions. In his words: ‘Progressive realism advocates using realist means to pursue progressive ends… It is the pursuit of ideals without delusions about what is achievable.’

The Chagos Islands agreement with Mauritius could be presented as  progressive realism in action: resolving an adjudication in international law against the UK’s continuing possession of the Islands via negotiations that have relinquished sovereignty; yet, also retaining a core security interest by leasing the sovereignty of the island of Diego Garcia for 99 years to allow its principal ally, the United States, to maintain a military base.

To properly assess whether progressive realism is inherently contradictory, as some commentators have suggested, needs longer than 100 days. Progressive realism may, of course, be quietly dropped as the government’s term of office lengthens (and join the Conservative Party’s ‘Global Britain’ mantra in the museum of UK foreign policy doctrine) and unexpected events challenge Britain’s foreign and security policy.

The Strategic Defence Review and the three other reviews of its foreign policy underway (on Britain’s diplomatic relationships, aid development work, and marrying foreign policy to economic and trade ambitions) may, in the end, be more significant guides to the Labour government’s foreign, security and defence policy.

European reset

At the core of Labour’s ambition is its desire to ‘reset’ the relationship with the EU, with the idea of a ‘security pact’ as a core proposition. The government’s aspiration to reach agreements with the EU to ease barriers to trade is a significant point of departure from its predecessor. However, with the current interregnum of leadership in Brussels, the relationship with the UK government has not progressed beyond the ambition to set a new tone and to agree on the principle of frequent EU-UK summits.

The EU-UK relationship looks to have reached a condition of détente where issues of mutual interest such as foreign and security policy cooperation might be expanded. But how much scope there is for substantive change in the terms and structure of the relationship is uncertain.

The serendipity of inheriting the hosting of the European Political Community within the first fortnight of coming to power allowed for a comprehensive introduction to Europe’s leaders. And a flurry of diplomatic visits to European capitals by the Foreign Secretary, and Prime Ministerial visits to Berlin and Paris, transmitted a sense of impetus for a new set of relationships. Starmer’s  visit to Germany furthered the push for a new bilateral German-UK treaty. And the Prime Minister has also built on the work of his predecessor in prioritising an improvement in British-Italian relations, despite Starmer and Meloni being further apart politically.

Rebuilding relationships across Europe, after the best part of a decade of domestic political dislocation, has made reacquiring a reputation for predictability a core imperative. But the broader UK strategy for its place in Europe – beyond a public diplomacy that stresses shared interests and an appetite for close cooperation – still lacks focus.

Washington makes the foreign policy weather

The upcoming event with the most anticipated foreign policy consequences is the result of the US presidential election. The intertwined nature of the UK-US foreign and security policy relationship means that a change of US administration often gives rise to neurotic diplomatic behaviour by Britain. Where the UK Prime Minister sits in terms of the sequence of congratulatory phone calls and White House visits is seen by British commentators as a proxy for Britain’s standing with the new administration. Labour has been cultivating relationships with both presidential candidates.

Far more consequential issues are at stake for the UK and Europe though this time around, with the prospect that a second Trump presidency could radically alter the US position on support for Ukraine. How US politics unfolds over the coming 100 days is likely to be of most consequence to where the Labour government’s foreign and security policy goes next.

The foreign policy of Labour’s first 100 days has been dominated by the same issues as those faced by its predecessor government. But the extent to which it will have the scope to chart a markedly different approach looks to be determined as much in Brussels and Washington as in London.

This commentary was first published by the UK in a Changing Europe.